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Abstract
The financial crisis has brought the problems of regulatory failure and unbridled counterparty risk to the forefront in financial 
discussions. In the last decade, central counterparties have been created in order to face those insidious problems. In Mexico, 
both the stock and the derivatives markets have central counterparties, but the money market has not. This paper addresses 
the issue of creating a central counterparty for the Mexican money market. Recommendations that must be followed in the 
design and the management of risk of a central counterparty, given by international regulatory institutions, are presented 
in this study. Also, two different conceptual designs for a central counterparty, appropriate for the Mexican market, are 
proposed. Final conclusions support the creation of a new central counterparty for the Mexican money market.
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resumen
La crisis financiera ha puesto en la agenda de las discusiones financieras los problemas sobre fallas en las regulaciones y 
el riesgo descontrolado de la contrapartida. En la última década, se han creado contrapartidas centrales para enfrentar estos 
insidiosos problemas. En México, tanto la bolsa como los mercados de derivados tienen contrapartidas centrales, pero el 
mercado de divisas no. En este estudio se presentan las recomendaciones que deberán seguirse para el diseño y manejo de 
riesgo de una contrapartida central, hechas por instituciones reguladoras internacionales. Al mismo tiempo, se proponen 
dos diseños conceptuales diferentes de contrapartidas centrales, apropiadas para el mercado mexicano. Las conclusiones 
finales sustentan la creación de una nueva contrapartida central para el mercado de valores mexicano.
Palabras claves: Contrapartida central, mercado de divisas, instituciones reguladoras internacionales.
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iNtroDUctioN
One distinguishing feature of the Mexican Financial 
System is the relatively large size of its money market. 
Every day, close to two trillion pesos1 is settled among 
market participants. A figure close to the Mexican GDP, 
considered to be around 10 trillion pesos, is thus traded 
in five operating days (El Financiero, 2008). By size, 
Mexico is the 14th economy of the world; it is estimated 
that the Mexican money market is the 8th largest, ranked 
by daily amount traded. A more striking comparison 
with the stock market is given on Table 12.
The Mexican Central Securities Depository (SD 
INDEVAL) undertook a major reengineering change 
in a project that started in 2005 (Romero et al. 2008). 
The implementation of the project, named Dali System, 
won the prestigious Edelman Award in 2010 (Muñoz 
et al. 2011). Since the beginning of the project, it was 
interesting to find that the Mexican stock exchange 
(Bolsa Mexicana de Valores or BMV), uses a central 
counterparty (Contraparte Central del Mercado de 
Valores). However, the Mexican money market –being 
by far more important than the former – does not. At the 
time, several discussions were held about the matter, but 
the realization of a formal study was deferred.
The subprime crisis, followed by the fall of Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, American Insurance Group, 
and the disappearance of all five big American invest-
ment banks, have brought the topics of regulatory 
failure and counterparty risk to the forefront in financial 
discussions (The Economist, Aug 2008, Oct 2008, Nov 
2008). One way to ameliorate that risk, providing the 
potential benefits of a central regulator, is to utilize a 
central counterparty, that is, a financial institution that 
acts as buyer to market participant sellers, and seller 
to market participant buyers. Thus, the interest in a 
central counterparty for the Mexican money market 
was revived. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze what are 
the major factors that must be taken into account in the 
design of a central counterparty for the money market 
in Mexico. The purpose of the study is fully supported 
by authorities of the Mexican Central Bank (Banxico) 
and by the BMV, which is closely associated to the 
SD INDEVAL4. Some of the underlying concepts are 
general for any central counterparty, so the study may 
be of interest to other readers.
This paper is divided as follows: Section 2 offers 
a definition of a CCP, and its main advantages and 
1  The exchange rate is 1 US$ = 12 pesos. 
2  Although there is a very modern Mexican Derivatives Mar-
ket, with Asigna acting as central counterparty, it was con-
sidered that stock trading has more similarities with bond 
trading than derivative contracts trading.
3  Delivery versus payment operations only.
Table 1.
Mexican Money and Stock Market Operations











Number of Titles 
Traded
December 2008 1.84 trillion pesos 134 billion 3.82 billion pesos 201 million
January 2009 1.72 trillion pesos 132 billion 4.13 billion pesos 210 million
Source: Data provided by SD INDEVAL and the Mexican Stock Market.
4  BMV owns the right to collect 41/42 of all future INDEVAL 
dividends, and has options to buy 41 of the 42 INDEVAL 
shares, if a modification in legislation ever allows this to 
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disadvantages are provided. Then, the most relevant 
recommendations for the design of a CCP, given by 
the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (CPSS/IOSCO), are summarized. Following 
these, risk management procedures, provided by the 
same organization, are presented. An overview of the 
relevant characteristics of the Mexican money market 
and a brief analysis of two possible conceptual designs 
for a central counterparty are presented. Finally, the 
conclusions of the paper and recommendations for 
further work are given.
ceNtrAL coUNterPArties
Definition
Since the 1990s, central counterparties (CCPs) have 
become more and more commonplace as a cornerstone 
of financial market infrastructures. Before starting 
with any possible analysis of the design of a CCP, it is 
necessary to define what a CCP is, what are its func-
tions, the risks which it faces, and its advantages and 
disadvantages. The most important CCPs worldwide 
are listed at the end of this section. 
The European Central Bank defines a CCP as an 
entity that mediate itself between the counterparties to 
every trade, acting as the buyer to every seller and the 
seller to every buyer (ECB 2004, 2007). This implies 
that the CCP is the counterparty for every seller and 
buyer; in other words, it acts as an intermediary.
The consequences of this mechanism are important 
because a well designed CCP can reduce the amount 
of counterparty risk that market participants face. 
This reduction of risk is a result of the concentration 
of knowledge that the CCP accomplishes during the 
process of managing all the transactions done in the 
market. The CCP knows who is buying and who is 
selling, but a given market participant may have a 
reduced knowledge about the others. Hence, the CCP 
may reduce the danger of speculation and, therefore, 
market distortions are lessened. 
Then, the mere presence of a party that is aware of 
all participants can help to reduce dramatically the risks 
for all of them, while helping to maintain the market 
operating in normal conditions. That is why trades on 
many major stock exchanges (including London and 
Tokyo) go through a central counterparty. As a result of 
their great contribution to the functioning of the stock 
markets, CCPs have been introduced recently to other 
markets, such as over-the-counter (OTC), derivatives 
and securities repurchase markets.
Advantages and disadvantages of a CCP
In his thesis, Marco Rast (2007) enumerates the main 
advantages and disadvantages of the existence of 
CCP in a given market. Some of the most significant 
advantages are:
1. Simplified  risk  management  /  risk  reduction: 
The settlement guarantees given by the Central 
Counterparty  result  in  lower  risks  and  lower 
equity costs. 
2. Post-trade anonymity: In settlement processes 
thorough  the  CCP  no  information  about  the 
trading parties is disclosed. 
3. Lower capital claims: If the Central Counter-
party allows for the cross-border settlement of 
different markets, and a reduction in the number 
of existing clearing links, then this may result 
in the consolidation of the capital required for 
margins.
4. Netting:  Increases  the  effectiveness,  capacity 
and liquidity of the marketplace and reduces the 
amount of capital required by the participants 
for their trading activities.
5. Network  simplicity  (not  mentioned  by  Rast): 
If there are n participants in the market and no 
CCP, there might be (n – 1) * n / 2 links among 
them. The existence of a CCP reduces the pos-
sible number of links to just n, thus simplifying 
the network for n > 3.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 52  December 2011
J. econ. finance adm. sci., 16(31), 2011
The main disadvantages of the presence of a CCP 
in a market are:
1. The advantages obtained from the presence of a 
CCP in the market are not equal for all the par-
ticipants. The advantages acquired are directly 
correlated with the size of the participant.
2. In small markets where there are no CCPs, the 
total costs and the risk involved in setting up a 
CCP service are relatively high and may even 
have a counterproductive effect, so it is more 
advisable to join an existing CCP.
3. The most important disadvantage is the concen-
tration of almost all the risks in a single party. If 
this party breaks down, then the functioning of 
the entire financial market is threatened.
4. A CCP can only implement its risk management 
instruments efficiently given sufficient trading 
liquidity. 
Clearly, the above mentioned advantages apply 
to any market. The disadvantages may depend on the 
given market. In the case of Mexico, the second and 
the fourth disadvantages are not relevant. Regarding 
the first disadvantage, the same situation appears in 
central securities depositories and may be reduced by 
granting the same weight to every participant’s share 
of the depository and by the active participation of the 
authorities. 
CCPs Organizations
There are associations that group CCPs all over the 
world so they can exchange experience and information 
about potential problems that may occur. The biggest 
and most significant of these organizations is the CCP12, 
founded in 2001 by the 12 largest CCPs at that moment 
in Europe, Asia and America. 
The purpose of the CCP12, according to its mandate, 
is to promote the industry’s dialogue on the adoption 
of best clearing and risk management practices, regula-
tory harmonization and pursuit of strategies which, in 
turn, will support the increase in cross border trading 
and facilitate interconnections between global markets, 
instruments and liquidity pools (2008). CCP12 deals 
with the growth of the volume of the operations, the 
emergence of liquidity pools, trading in new financial 
instruments, the movement from cash markets to more 
hybrid type OTC derivate instruments, and the concerns 
of regulators for greater transparency and risk manage-
ment safeguards.
The 23 member organizations of CCP12 include:
•  Australian Securities Exchange Ltd. 
•  The Brazilian Clearing and Depository Corpo-
ration 
•  Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange 
•  The Canadian Depository for Securities Ltd. 
•  Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation 
•  Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia S.p.A. 
•  The Clearing Corporation of India 
•  Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
•  The Clearing Corporation 
•  The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
•  Eurex Clearing AG 
•  Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. 
•  Japan Securities Clearing Corporation 
•  LCH Clearnet Group Limited 
•  Korea Exchange 
•  National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited 
•  NASDAQ OMX 
•  The Options Clearing Corporation 
•  The Polish National Depository for Securities 
•  Singapore Exchange Limited / The Central De-
pository (Pte) Limited 
•  SD INDEVAL 
•  Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation 
•  Tokyo Stock Exchange Group, Inc 
GeNerAL coNsiDerAtioNs 
For tHe DesiGN oF A ccP
The International Organization of Securities Commis-
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recommendations that must be taken into account in 
the design of a CCP.
Legal Risk
The legal system (including bankruptcy laws) should 
clearly support novation or open offer5, netting, default 
procedures, collateral and clearing fund arrangements, 
enforceability of a CCP’s rules with regard to its 
participants, insolvency of the CCP, conflict of laws 
determinations, and a CCP’s access to information about 
participants. If the legal framework is underdeveloped, 
opaque or inconsistent, the resulting legal risk will 
undermine a CCP’s ability to operate effectively. 
The legal framework must specify the moment in 
which the CCP acquires the responsibility with the 
participants and the moment in which those responsibili-
ties end. The involvement of the CCP in the collateral 
must be clearly outlined and this collateral must be 
quickly accessible for the CCP so it can promptly meet 
its obligations.
The laws of the relevant jurisdictions should support 
the provisions of the CCP’s legal agreements with its 
settlement banks relating to finality. Similarly, there 
should be a clear and effective legal basis for the finality 
of the transfers of financial instruments.
Participation Criteria
A CCP must stipulate the participants to have enough 
resources and a solid operational capacity to meet their 
obligations arising from participations in the CCP. 
Requirements should be clearly stated and publicly 
disclosed so as to promote certainty and transparency. 
To avoid discrimination against certain types of users, 
the criteria must be limited to deny the access only for 
risk control reasons. In fact, the criteria should ensure 
participants are solvent, well managed and have good 
operational capacity. They should be able to process the 
expected volumes within the stipulated time.
Measurement and management
of credit exposures
A CCP should limit its exposure to potential losses 
due to a participant default in normal market condi-
tions through the request of guarantees or other control 
mechanisms. At the same time, a CCP can estimate its 
current credit exposure to every participant by marking 
each participant’s more outstanding contracts to current 
market prices and netting any gains against any losses 
(Mark-to-market). A CCP should estimate this credit 
exposure frequently – at least once a day –, so that the 
estimate is reasonably accurate.
The most common mechanism that a CCP can use 
to protect itself against losses arising from a participant 
default is to request all of them to deposit a margin that 
is proportional to their potential losses.
Margin Requirements
The margin requirements must be enough to cover losses 
in case a participant’s default occurs in normal market 
conditions. The need for these margin requirements is 
more evident for contracts that have a long duration, 
because the potential risk is directly correlated to the 
time of exposure.
When setting the margin requirements, the CCP 
should use models and parameters that capture the risks 
characteristics of the compensated products. Margin 
requirements impose opportunity costs on CCP par-
ticipants, so the CCP needs to strike a balance between 
greater protection for itself and higher opportunity costs 
for its participants. Although these margin requirements 
are not intended to cover all possible losses, it is nec-
essary that the CCP has the ability to make intraday 
margins calls to avoid building up risks.
5  Novation implies that the original contract between the buyer 
and seller is extinguished and replaced by two new contracts, 
one between the CCP and the buyer and the other between the 
CCP and the seller. An open offer system implies that a CCP 
is automatically and immediately interposed in a transaction 
at the moment the buyer and seller agree on the terms.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 54  December 2011
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Financial Resources
A CCP must have enough financial resources to face, 
at least, a default of the participant to which it has the 
largest exposure in extreme but plausible market condi-
tions. Although a CCP does not need to have resources 
to cover a default from all participants, it must consider 
the possibility that two or more participants may not 
fulfill their responsibilities at the same time.
To evaluate the adequacy of their financial resources, 
the CCPs must use stress tests in which they should as-
sume extreme conditions in the market. In case that the 
tests indicate that resources are not enough, the CCP 
must inform the procedures that it will follow.
In the analysis of the adequacy of its resources, 
the CCP should only include those resources that are 
quickly available given a default. A CCP must obtain 
credit lines for the amount of resources that are not 
easily accessible in case of a default and wishes to use 
to meet this criterion. In some cases, the CCP asks their 
participants to pledge additional resources when a large 
default happens.
Default Procedures
These procedures are intended to secure the continu-
ity of all the functions of a CCP by limiting the effect 
that a default could cause to the other participants. The 
objectives of the procedures are:
•	 To minimize the losses that a default may cause 
to the CCP and other participants.
•	 To enable the CCP to keep fulfilling its obliga-
tions.
Before a CCP can establish the default procedures, 
it must first define what a default is, how an event can 
be declared as default, if it is going to be declared 
default automatically or if someone is responsible 
of that (in which case should appoint who has that 
responsibility).
After that is completed, the CCP must issue a set of 
procedures about the measures that it will take when a 
default is declared. These procedures should allow the 
CCP the following:
•	 To define the modifications to be applied to the 
accounts of the participants in case of a default. 
A  CCP  should  have  arrangements  or  mecha-
nisms to facilitate the transfer, closeout or hedg-
ing of a defaulting participant’s proprietary po-
sitions promptly. 
•	 To use any financial resource to cover losses or 
to fight back liquidity pressures.
It is necessary that the national legislation should 
back up the default procedures defined, so the CCP has 
no problem in applying them. Finally, these procedures 
must be made public to inform everybody and be able 
to adjust to them when necessary.
Custody and Investment Risks
A CCP should hold assets in a manner that the risk of 
loss or delay in its access is minimized, while the as-
sets invested by a CCP should be held in instruments 
with minimal credit, market and liquidity risks. A CCP 
has the responsibility to ensure that such investments 
do not compromise its ability to use the funds for their 
intended purpose. 
In the case where a CCP needs a custodian –a central 
securities depository (CSD) or a financial institution–, 
the CCP should determine if the custodial procedures 
and internal controls of its custodian are good enough to 
protect the securities against the custodian’s insolvency, 
negligence, misuse of assets, fraud, poor administration, 
or inadequate record keeping. Of course, the custodian 
must have a solid financial position so potential losses 
could be covered easily.
Operational Risk
The importance of the operational risk lies in its capac-
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address other risks and to cause participants to incur 
in unforeseen losses. To minimize operational risk, 
CCPs should actively identify and analyze sources of 
risk, whether arising from the arrangements of the CCP 
itself, from those of its participants, or from external 
factors, and establish clear policies and procedures to 
address those risks. 
All key systems, especially the technological ones, 
should be secure, reliable, and scalable (to be applied 
to different scenarios without the necessity of making 
great changes on them) and should have the capacity 
to deal with stressful circumstances. A CCP must have 
a contingency plan to face events that may cause its 
systems to fail. This contingency plans must include 
objectives, policies and procedures.
Money Settlements
A CCP should apply mechanisms that eliminate or reduce 
the credit and liquidity risks due to the use of banks to 
complete money settlements with its participants. To 
make such money settlements, a CCP should make ar-
rangements with its participants and one or more banks 
(its own settlement banks). There can be identified two 
types of monetary settlements:
1. In the first type, the Central Bank is used as 
the settlement agent. Through the central bank 
model, a CCP’s settlement bank risks are elimi-
nated. However, this central bank model may 
not always be practicable because it requires a 
CCP to have access to an account with the cen-
tral bank.
2. The second type is called the “settlement bank 
model”. In this model, a CCP selects one or more 
banks that are going to be the ones that settle its 
transactions. Settlement banks should be subject 
to effective banking supervision and regulation; 
they should be well capitalized and have access 
to  ample  liquidity  in  the  marketplace. At  the 
same time, the banks should have the technical 
capacity to provide reliable payment services at 
the times and on the terms required by the CCP. 
Physical Deliveries
Some of the settlements cleared by CCPs require (or 
permit) physical settlement. Those settlements imply 
a delivery by the seller to the buyer of the deliverable 
assets against cash payment. This physical delivery 
makes the CCP face all types of risks, especially prin-
cipal risk.
If a CCP guarantees the delivery of a physical instru-
ment, then the CCP faces a liquidity risk associated to 
the acquisition of such instrument, due to the possibility 
that the seller does not fulfill his responsibilities. Also, 
if a CCP has an obligation to make a delivery, the CCP 
should eliminate principal risk through the use of the 
available delivery versus payment (DVP) mechanism. 
A DVP mechanism links a system for transferring funds 
(payment) to a system for transferring the physical in-
strument (delivery) in a way that ensures that payment 
occurs if and only if delivery occurs.
When there is no DVP mechanism for settlements, 
a CCP should take other measures to mitigate principal 
risk like holding a margin to mitigate the pre-settlement 
price risk of a position. These margin deposits should 
be held until delivery is complete. Generally, the value 
of that margin might be less than the principal value 
at risk at delivery, so a CCP should build additional 
protections into the delivery process. Some CCPs re-
quire participants to pre-fund payments associated with 
deliveries or to provide some form of payment through 
an agent bank.
Risks in Links between CCPs
Links between CCPs bring great advantages to the 
participants. For instance, it   allows the participants of 
a CCP for one market to trade in another market while 
clearing that trade through their existing arrangements. 
Links can deepen the liquidity in markets and they also 
help to reduce the costs of systems development and 
operation faced by CCPs because it enables them to 
share these expenses. These links between CCPs may 
take some of the following forms:Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 56  December 2011
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1. One CCP becomes a clearing participant of ano-
ther CCP without any further integration of sys-
tems.
2. The CCPs merge their systems to offer a single 
clearing platform.
Conversely, links could bring to the scene some 
risks, such as legal or operational risks. Legal risks 
are originated because of the differences between the 
laws and norms in places where the jurisdiction change; 
operational risks are originated due to the differences in 
the performance of the institutions that interact.
Efficiency
Some of the characteristics that a CCP must have to be 
efficient are the following:
1. CCPs should seek to meet the service require-
ments of participants in a cost-effective manner. 
This includes meeting the needs of its partici-
pants, operating reliably and having adequate 
system capacity to handle both current and po-
tential activity.
2. When looking at the overall costs of CCPs, it 
is important to include both the direct costs of 
operating any facilities and indirect costs.
3. CCPs may use some mechanisms to improve 
efficiency like developing technical capabilities 
to meet operational service requirements of par-
ticipants.
4. A CCP must establish communication procedu-
res and standards that support straight through 
processing of transactions.
5. A CCP must periodically review its service le-
vels, costs, pricing and operational reliability. 
Governance
An effectively governed institution should meet a mini-
mum of requirements such as the following ones:
1. Governance arrangements should be clearly spe-
cified and publicly available.
2. The board should contain suitable expertise and 
take into account all relevant interests.
3. The board should be accountable to owners and 
participants for their performance.
4. Reporting  lines  between  management  and  the 
board should be clear and direct.
5. The board should be responsible for selecting, 
evaluating and, if necessary, removing the senior 
managers.
Transparency
It should be considered necessary that a CCP discloses 
its rules and regulations to the participants, their rights 
and obligations, the risks and the corresponding steps 
to mitigate them, costs of using their services, laws 
and general procedures. At the same time, the CCP 
should disclose appropriate quantitative information 
on its clearing, netting and settlement activities and 
risk management performance. The CCP should also 
inform clearly in what circumstances it will assume 
counterparty exposure and, of course, any restriction 
or limitations in the fulfillment of its obligations.
risK MANAGeMeNt by A ccP
Any market presents some implicit risks in its daily 
operation due to the nondeterministic nature of the 
activities performed. If those risks are thoroughly 
analyzed, then there is a better chance to manage them 
so that the impact they cause on the functioning of the 
system may be minimized.
It is necessary to notice that the risks that a given 
CCP deals with may vary significantly if compared to 
the risks that others CCPs face. The particular risks that 
a CCP encounter depend really on the stipulations of 
its contracts with its participants.           De Lascurain: Considerations for the Design of a Central Counterparty for the Mexican Money Market 57 Vol. 16, Nº 31
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The Technical Committee of the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions (CPSS/IOSCO, 
2004) identifies a set of common risks that the CCPs 
have to face and, in consequence, must manage. In the 
following, a list of the most common risks and the man-
ner the CCPs actually manage them are synthesized.
Counterparty Credit Risk
a. Definition
This is the risk of a loss due to a participant’s default, 
generally as a consequence of its insolvency. This risk 
can be divided into two categories:
1. Pre-Settlement risk: it is also known as “Repla-
cement risk”, and it refers to the loss from repla-
cing open contracts with the defaulting partici-
pant.
2. Principal Risk: this deals with the loss in deli-
veries or payments from the defaulting partici-
pant.
If a participant commits a default, then the CCP 
would terminate its entire contracts; however, the 
CCP would keep meeting its obligations with the 
other participants. The chance that someone commits 
a default implies that a risk to the CCP arises. The re-
placement cost arises because the CCP has to liquidate 
the contracts at prices that may be different from the 
original ones. Finally, settlement risk arises when the 
full principal value is at risk. That happens when the 
settlement implies a delivery, but it is not a delivery 
versus payment model.
b. Approach to Manage the Risk
Most CCPs impose the participants some requirements 
so the risks associated with their activities could be 
minimized. These requirements are as follows:
1. Participation  requirements.  The  CCP  imposes 
the participants to meet minimum capital requi-
rements and a certain operational capability to 
be  admitted  or  to  continue  participating.  The           
capital  requirements  are  directly  correlated  to 
the level of risk that the activities of that partici-
pant imply.
2. Position or trading limits. CCPs may control the 
level of exposure they can face in relation with 
every  participant  so  it  can  limit  the  potential 
effects that a possible default may cause.
3. Margin requirements. This requirement refers to 
the imposition that a CCP applies to the partici-
pants so that they provide collaterals (or guaran-
tees) to cover potential future losses. Although 
these margins are supposed to cover a high per-
centage of the potential losses, they are not in-
tended to cover the total amount.
4. Financial  resources. A  CCP  must  ask  for  the               
participants to have a sufficient amount of finan-
cial resources to back up their daily operations. 
Those  financial  resources  can  take  the  form                 
either of assets held directly by a CCP or of con-
tingent claims.
5. Default procedures. A CCP must have procedures 
in  case  some  participant  does  not  meet  its 
obligations. Those procedures must specify the 
ability the CCP has to transfer, close-out or hedge 
positions of a defaulting participant quickly.
Liquidity Risk
When two participants make a deal agreeable to the CCP, 
it is immediately obligated to make and receive all pay-
ments agreed initially. In the daily operation there may 
be a moment when the transactions are not liquidated, 
and where the buyer has not paid the agreed assets to 
the CCP, but the CCP still has to meet its obligations to 
the seller. Therefore, the CCP has to use its own capital 
in order to pay the seller.
Settlement Bank Risk
This risk refers to the possibility that the bank that pro-
vides the cash for money settlements fails in meeting Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 58  December 2011
J. econ. finance adm. sci., 16(31), 2011
its obligations. This risk is eliminated by some CCPs 
by using the central bank as the liquidating bank.
Custody Risk
To manage credit risk a CCP could ask the participants 
to post a margin so the CCP can protect itself from the 
risk that arises as a result of the exposure it is facing. 
Having those margins implies a custody risk to the 
CCP. In this case, the CCP hires a third party to be the 
custodian. In turn, the custody risk would be the risk 
that the custodian may not meet its obligations.
In order to manage this risk, the CCP must verify that 
the custodian achieves the best safekeeping standards. 
The custodian’s assets must be free of the claims of 
its creditors. Evidently, it follows that the custodian 
should demonstrate a solid financial position with robust 
internal controls.
Investment Risk
The CCP may have to invest its capital (equities and 
reserves) so that it can generate revenues and may cover 
some of the costs of operations. Those investments 
should be made in short-term bank deposits or securities 
that have minimal market risk. Although the investments 
could be almost risk-less, those investments face an 
implicit risk. That risk is the investment risk.
Thus, the CCP should limit its investment to liquid 
instruments and establish standards for the creditwor-
thiness of obligors. Investments may also be secured. 
Limits on concentrations of investments by obligor 
may be utilized.
Operational Risk
This risk consists in the chance of having unexpected 
losses due to deficiencies in internal systems, human 
error, external events or management failure. To ensure 
that this type of risk is minimized, three types of mea-
sures should be taken:
1. Human personal should be trained and supervi-
sed adequately by personnel with expertise.
2. Internal procedures and systems should be re-
viewed frequently.
3. CCP’s computer systems, communications sys-
tems,  power  systems  and  data  feeds  must  be 
installed properly and they should count with re-
dundancy systems so that the proper functioning 
is assured.
Legal Risk
This risk implies that the legal framework (laws and 
regulations) does not support the rules, the terms of 
contracts, the property rights or any other aspects 
of interest of a CCP. The CCPs must create a legal 
framework that supports entirely every aspect of its 
operations, including laws and rules to be applied to 
the participants.
reLeVANt FeAtUres oF tHe 
MexicAN MoNey MArKet
A detailed description of the operation of the Mexican 
markets can be found in Romero et al. (2008). In this 
section, some relevant aspects of the operation of the 
money market are presented.
The main regulator of the Mexican money market 
is the Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) through 
regulations on securities operations and on repurchase 
agreements6. Other authorities involved are the 
Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV, the 
Mexican banking and securities commission), and the 
Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el 
Retiro (CONSAR, the institution in charge of regulat-
ing the operation of pension funds in Mexico that receive 
federally mandated contributions from employers). 
The main participants in the Mexican money mar-
ket are:
•	 Banxico
•	 Credit institutions, local and foreign
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Most money market operations are settled at 
INDEVAL.
The most important issuer of money market securities 
is the Federal Government. Banxico acts as the issuer-
agent and depositary of those securities and holds weekly 
auctions of Government debt instruments. Mexican 
credit institutions and public and private companies 
are other issuers in the market.
Large numbers of securities are kept by pension 
funds and by other participants, like investment funds, 
insurance companies and institutional investors. The 
“rotation” of those securities is relatively low. It is 
relevant to mention that an important part of the se-
curities are owned by foreigners, through the use of 
custodian banks. 
By means of money market trade mechanisms, 
two participants agree on the terms of a deal. The 
participants may act for themselves or representing 
third parties, thus acting as custodians. Most trades 
are negotiated bilaterally over the phone, but there are 
other Electronic Trade Mechanisms (ETM) that should 
be taken into account like SIF, Remate, and Enlace, 
which are privately owned7. Central Bank’s regulations 
specify that the terms and conditions of the deal must be 
transmitted electronically to INDEVAL’s Dali System 
the day of the trade, to be matched, cleared and settled 
according to the terms and conditions negotiated by 
the participants. 
Approved settlements must imply either of the fol-
lowing: Delivery versus Payment operations; Delivery 
versus Delivery operations (i.e., bond interchanges); 
Delivery Free of Payment operations (i.e., transferring 
bonds from one account to another); Payment operations 
(i.e., interest payments); or a Payment versus Payment 
operation (i.e., currency operations) (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, 2003). 
The most common way to obtain liquidity in the 
market is through the use of repurchase agreements, 
by which a participant sells its titles to other partici-
pant, with the promise to repurchase those titles in the 
future. By far, most repurchase agreements deal with 
Government titles, and over 95% of them are same-
day transactions8. It is estimated9 that over 50% of the 
operations in the Mexican money market are same-day 
DVP operations linked to repurchase agreements.
In today’s operation at INDEVAL, around 50 opera-
tions – of which around 13 are DVP – are cancelled at the 
end of the day due to lack of compliance by one of the 
participants. The participants involved are informed of 
the facts and they must settle their differences. Although 
this is a small percentage of the total of daily operations 
(in the order of 30,000), this fact shows the existence of 
risky operations that could be reduced by the presence 
of a CCP, or by some other mechanisms10.
To conclude, in the Mexican money market there 
is no global electronic exchange, since most transac-
tions are carried through by telephone. This means 
that the operations are highly concentrated among few 
participants. It also means that the market is far from 
being free-of-risk. 
coNcePtUAL oVerALL DesiGNs
As has been discussed throughout the paper, the Mexican 
money market would be enhanced by the presence of 
a central counterparty. Two conceptual overall designs 
for a CCP for the Mexican money market may be pre-
sented as follows:
7  Today, they generate only approximately 6% of the trades.
  8  Banxico.
  9  By INDEVAL.
10   It is worth mentioning that repurchase agreements are heavily 
regulated in the Mexican market. Also, INDEVAL offers to 
its clients a service called SAVAR, which manages collaterals 
for repurchase agreements.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 60  December 2011
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1. The Dali System has a single entry point. An en-
tity that acts as a pure CCP placed at the entran-
ce of the System may be developed and put into 
operation. It would only accept trades from the 
counterparties that comply with CCP rules and 
requirements, acting then as the buyer to every 
seller and the seller to every buyer.
2. An entity that acts with the dual purpose of an 
Electronic Trade Mechanism and CCP (ETM-
CCP) may be designed and put into operation. 
Besides widening and deepening the operation 
of today’s market, it would have the advantage 
that it would accept bids and offers in electro-
nic market rounds of only pre-approved parti-
cipants, thus preventing the emergence of risk, 
and strengthening anonymity. 
The first design has the advantage of its simplicity 
and could include the current stock market operation 
done by the Contraparte Central del Mercado de Va-
lores. The second one is more ambitious, because it 
implies the development of an electronic money market 
managed by a central counterparty. More on these topics 
is presented in the following section.
coNcLUsioNs AND FUrtHer WorK
1. The Mexican Finance System has evolved in the 
past few years and it is now one of the most modern 
and efficient systems of the world. The recognition 
given by the Edelman Award gives credit to this ad-
vance.
2. A sample of cooperative behavior among the public, 
private and the academic sectors is the development 
of the Dali System, where a rules-based system, using 
a unique settlement algorithm, performs real-time 
clearing, netting and settlement of the transactions 
of Mexican securities markets. Developing a CCP 
for the money market could be another instance of 
such successful behavior.
3. Both the stock and the derivatives markets in Mexi-
co use central counterparties, thus ameliorating the 
risk involved in their operations. A central counter-
party for the money market is a natural extension 
and would offer overall risk reduction in the finan-
cial system.
4. It may be argued that the benefits obtained from the 
presence of a CCP in the market are not equal for all 
the participants. The benefits acquired are directly 
correlated with the size of the participant. The same 
situation appears in central securities depositories 
and it can be reduced by granting the same weight 
to every participant’s share of the depository and by 
the active participation of the authorities.
5. The most important disadvantage of a CCP is the 
concentration of almost all the risks in a single par-
ty. If this party breaks down, then the functioning of 
the entire market is threatened. This argument must 
be used very carefully because it would disqualify 
the operation of modern central banks and central 
depositories, which have in-built mechanisms that 
prevent their failure. However, the same logic may 
be used in this case: the advantages of a CCP out-
weigh this disadvantage.
6. Nevertheless,  risk  concentration  is  an  important 
issue. Thus, it is not advised to fuse the central 
counterparties that operate in the Mexican markets, 
since today most liquidity is provided to the whole 
financial system by Banxico, as discussed in sec-
tion Risks in Links between CCPs.
7. Two different overall conceptual designs are offe-
red in this work. The author strongly recommends 
the integrated ETM-CCP option, because it would 
reinforce today’s operation of the Mexican money 
market, while providing it with strong risk-reducing 
mechanisms. 
8. Further analyses in the following areas are requi-
red: 
a. A statistical analysis of the transactions and ope-
rations carried by the market participants would 
give a better insight on how the market functions, 
and would discover the potential risk problems 
that have to be dealt-with in the design.           De Lascurain: Considerations for the Design of a Central Counterparty for the Mexican Money Market 61 Vol. 16, Nº 31
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b. A legal study must be launched to assess if the 
actual Mexican legal framework may support the 
operation of a CCP for the money market. Law 
changes, if needed, must be precisely identified 
and politically gauged.
c. Cost-benefit analyses of both proposed designs 
have to be carried through. 